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INTRODUCTION

Under the George W. Bush administration, the United States actively pursued two
seemingly confluent foreign policy objectives: to promote democracy worldwide and to
deter terrorism, not just in the United States, but worldwide. While these two objectives
seemed to go hand in hand theoretically (“If they can vote, they won’t need to bomb
anything to coerce public officials.”), they did not work so neatly together in practice.
Other studies have investigated the interactions of terrorism, democracy, and the
economy, yet few have looked at these three in as much detail as they ought to have.
Democracy is neither well-defined nor easily encapsulated as a binary variable. For this
reason, I use the POLITY IV data set to split government regimes in to three different
types of regimes, autocracies, anocracies, and democracies in order to challenge old
assumptions and to perhaps create new assumptions – assumptions which may prove to
be useful in determining public policy.

DEFINING DEMOCRACY
In his 1991 book entitled The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century, the late American historian Samuel Huntington argued that in 1974 the number
of democracies began to surge for the third time in history.1 However, it was not until
1991 that the first African leader peacefully stepped down after losing an election. Since
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Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 3.
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this groundbreaking election in Benin, at least nine other African leaders have similarly
stepped down.2
One of the shortcomings of Huntington’s hypothesis is that, while few would
argue that African countries have not made significant gains in political freedoms and
civil liberties over the past few decades, it remains difficult to call them true democracies.
Rather, they rest somewhere in the middle of the spectrum between consolidated
democracies and full autocracies.
There are many different approaches to defining what makes a true democracy.
The minimalists say that it only requires elections, whereas more elaborate definitions
include the necessity of various civil liberties. One of the most prominent definitions of a
true electoral democracy comes from the trusted, Washington-based think tank known as
Freedom House. According to their definition, an electoral democracy includes:
1. A competitive, multiparty political system.
2. Universal adult suffrage for all citizens (with exceptions for restrictions that states
may legitimately place on citizens such as sanctions for criminal offenses).
3. Regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy,
reasonable ballot security, and in the absence of massive voter fraud that yield
results that are unrepresentative of the public will.
4. Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the
media and through generally open political campaigning.3
While the absence of one of these criteria means that a nation cannot be considered an
electoral democracy, Freedom House may deem that the country is still ‘Partly Free.’
Such a designation shows that even influential think tanks believe that democracies
cannot easily be defined as a dichotomous ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
2

“A Good Example.” The Economist. October 22, 2009.
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Other democracy indices go yet even further than Freedom House. The Economist
Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Index of Democracy4 includes the functioning of government,
meaning that ‘if democratically based decisions cannot or are not implemented then the
concept of democracy is not very meaningful or it becomes an empty shell.” The EIU
also includes the political culture in its calculations. A nation with a high political culture
score would have a fervently active citizenry that would regularly be divided into winners
and losers, yet the losers would allow for the peaceful transition of power. Another index,
Vanhanen’s ‘Polyarchy Index,’ pays particular attention to participation.5 A democracy in
which a significant portion of the population does not participate can hardly be expected
to represent the will of the people. For this paper, I have opted to use the Polity IV data
set, which is similar to that of the EIU. I will go into further detail about this set later
under the data section.
Having discussed what an ideal democracy would look like, it is important to look
at the alternatives. At the far opposite end of the spectrum, there are countries like North
Korea, which is about as autocratic as possible. Fully authoritarian regimes harshly crack
down on any dissent, do not have multi-party elections, and generally do not respect
universal human rights.
Clearly presenting democracy as a binary variable creates a false dichotomy. If a
country is not a full democracy, one cannot assume that it is a full autocracy. Take the
4
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nation of Turkey as an example. According to Freedom House, they were partly free in
2010.6 Their level of freedom and democracy simply were not up to the same levels as,
nations like the United States, yet it was clearly above others such as Saudi Arabia. These
in-between nations are called by many different names, including flawed democracies,
hybrid regimes, and even anocracies, but for the remainder of this paper, they will be
referred to as anocracies, as that is what the Polity IV scale calls them.
While defining democracy is difficult enough, actually trying to quantify the
strength of a democracy becomes an added challenge. Munck and Verkuilen (2002) claim
there are three challenges surrounding this process: conceptualization, measurement, and
aggregation.7
In order to conceptualize an index of democracy, one must first settle upon its
definition. The ‘thicker’ the definition is, the more variables one must include, which
runs the risk of adding ‘theoretically irrelevant attributes.’8 Similarly, if I take too
minimalist of a definition, I run the risk of leaving out potentially important attributes.
While I am not about to say there is a single, perfect definition I must strive for, these are
problems that must be carefully thought out before the analyzing can even begin.
Having decided upon a certain definition and its attributes, I must determine how
to measure them. For example, if the attribute is that elections are regularly contested,
one might choose the number of years between elections as an indicator. These indicators
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Freedom House, “Map of Freedom in the World 2010,”
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ought to be reasonably homogenous, require minimal distinctions and should be able to
be cross-checked through multiple sources.

TERRORISM
In this section I will look at prior academic findings to define terrorism, to explain
how often it occurs, and to discuss how it affects the economy while controlling for
different regime types (autocracy, anocracy, and democracy).
While one man’s terrorist may be another’s freedom fighter, I must still come to an
apolitical definition of terrorism to continue. According to Enders and Sandler (2005),
terrorism is defined as:
‘the premeditated use or threat of use of extranormal
violence or brutality by subnational groups or individuals to
obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear
directed at a large audience.’9

This is in line with most other definitions, including the United States’ legal definition of
terrorism, which is that it involves ‘acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of
the criminal laws of the United States or of any State’ and is intended to intimidate a
civilian population and influence government policy. 10
In effect, terrorism is little more than deadly theater. Terrorists use mass media to
stir up a frenzy among the populace and divert attention to their goals, which can be
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Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, “Transnational Terrorism 1968-2000: Thresholds,
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political, social, religious, nationalist, or ethnic, etc. Their terror is greatly amplified by
their seemingly random time and locations.
Abadie and Gardeazabal quoted a Congressional Joint Economic Committee
which found that terrorism has four main economic effects:
1. Capital stock (human and physical) of a country is reduced as a result of
terrorist attacks
2. The terrorist threat induces higher levels of uncertainty.
3. Terrorism promotes increases in counter-terrorism expenditures, drawing
resources from productive sectors for use in security.
4. Terrorism is known to affect negatively specific industries such as
tourism11
The majority of these channels are not the direct results of the destruction wrought upon
the country, but rather are the results of our reactions. With the possible exception of
outlier attacks such as the collapse of the World Trade Centers on September 11th, 2001,
terrorist attacks themselves have proportionally much smaller effect than the public’s
reaction to them.
In addition to these four effects, the Milken Institute published the “Economic
Impacts of Global Terrorism: From Munich to Bali” which further describes the different
economic effects of terrorism. One of their discoveries is that terrorist attacks act as a
‘frictional cost and, unlike increased taxes or tariffs, does not provide public revenue.’
Indeed, doubling the number of terrorist attacks reduces bilateral trade by approximately
4 percent12.
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Many studies have empirically shown that terrorist attacks, especially deadly
ones, occur more frequently in democratic countries than in autocratic countries. For
example, in “The Macroeconomic Consequences of Terrorism,” Blomberg, Hess and
Orphanides showed that the incidence of terrorism was almost twice as likely in a rich
democracy (0.425) than in a non-democracy (.233). However, when terrorism is viewed
on a per capita basis, the ‘relationship between governance, income, and terrorism is
somewhat smaller.’13 Such findings may come as a surprise to some who believe that
democracy allows citizens to peacefully and regularly change the path their country is
taking, therefore eliminating the need for political violence.
There are likely to be many causes why democracies face so many more terrorist
attacks. One potential explanation concerns the information liberalization and the
globalization that occurs when a country democratizes. Citizens have access to much
more information, including seditious or hateful works which have the potential to incite
political violence. They also have easy access to the information necessary to pulling off
an attack.
Another reason democracies are more susceptible to attacks is inherent to the
government’s structure. Stephen Nemeth explains this as the ‘loyalty index,’ the ratio of

October 2006. pp 13-16
<http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/econ_impact_terrorism.pdf> (accessed April 4,
2011)
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the “winning coalition” to the “selectorate.”14 The selectorate is the subset of the
population that can influence public policy, which in a democracy is the electorate and in
an autocracy it could be a few elites or party members. The winning coalition is a subset
of this selectorate which is loyal to the leader in charge, which could simply be members
of the majority party in a democracy.
Since the winning coalition can be highly variable in a democracy, and since the
selectorate is virtually everyone, terrorists have an incentive to launch devastating public
attacks. The fear is spread among the masses, forcing the leaders to take action.
Furthermore, in a democracy with independent media, it is likely that the fright which the
attacks impose is even greater.
By approaching the logic behind terrorist attacks, it becomes easier to understand
why certain types of governments suffer different types of terrorism. In highly autocratic
regimes, one is most likely to see assassinations, kidnappings, and acts of sabotage,
whereas democracies are most likely to witness public attacks. In fact, for the past two
decades, democracies have been the exclusive victim of suicide attacks.15 Nemeth
showed that, regardless of region, countries “scoring low on the Polity IV democracy
score provided the highest level of attacks on political leaders and the lowest on the

14

Stephen Nemeth. “Adaptive Tactics: Terrorist Targeting and Regime Type” University
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public.”16 The public may not clamor to change policy after a kidnapping as much as they
would if they felt their own lives were at stake.
Terrorists also consider democracies to be weaker than authoritarian regimes.17
The government is subject to the will of the people, and therefore politicians must show
their supporters that they are working to prevent future attacks. They can do this through
stricter security or through concessions to the terrorists. Even if the politicians chose to
do nothing, the terrorists could alter the national conversation about their grievances and
pave the way for concessions down the road.
The Polity IV project provides ample reasoning to investigate this issue. Using
their measures, they have shown that the annual likelihood of an act of political
instability is most likely to occur in the anocracy range (-5<polity<5).18 While this
measure does not include terrorism, it is worth examining if this trend applies to terrorism
as well.
Finally, while I have methodically gone through much of the literature explaining
democracy and terrorism, there has been an odd lack of information of the effect of
terrorism on regimes besides OECD and ‘others.’ This paper hopes to spur further
literature on the subject.

16
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DATA
The majority of the economic data comes from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI) and the Africa Development Index (WDI). The WDI
contains national data from 213 countries beginning in 1960.19 These indicators cover a
wide range of topics, from health care to the environment to the economies of each of
these countries. The majority of the data used in this paper originated from this
publication.
The WDI provided the measure I used for the net inflows of foreign direct
investment (FDI). FDI is an important measure as it can be used as a bellwether for the
level of risk associated with doing business in the country. Foreign investors have great
flexibility in choosing where they want to do business. If two countries are relatively
comparable in costs, but there is a higher probability of an attack in one (thus increasing
the expected cost there), firms will shift to the more stable country.
I also looked at a country’s gross capital formation rate, calculated annually. A
country’s gross capital formation attempts to identify the value of fixed, immovable
investments which are created in a year. Again, these types of investments are a type of
proxy for the market risk for long run stability. If a firm believes that any conflicts were
about to occur in a region, they would not likely invest significant sums of money into
fixed capital.
The total population used in this data set represents the total number of permanent
residents in a country. The WDI includes all residents regardless of legal status or

19
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citizenship – except for refugees and asylum-seekers, who are still considered residents
of their country of origin. The total population measure is useful for it allows us to make
per capita calculations and hopefully discover more significant results.
The 1990s were a period of great commodity price inflation. Since most
economies in sub-Saharan Africa are not highly industrialized, they often rely on
exporting primary commodities to other countries where value is added. Since reliance on
primary goods leads to a significantly higher probability of suffering the resource curse
or the ‘Dutch Disease,’ economic conditions that ought to be controlled for, I decided to
use the WDI’s data on primary commodities exports as a percentage of GDP.
The extent to which a country has an open economy could be a significant factor
in determining how much a terrorist attack affects an economy. I took a country’s net
trade, measured as the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. The higher
this percentage is, the more vulnerable an economy is to outside influences. In highly
volatile world markets, or in markets skittish about investing in risky locations, investors
might be quick to exit the market. As mentioned in the literature review, terrorist attacks
tend to create costly barriers to trade as governments try to increase border security. With
these reasons in mind, I decided to investigate whether the trade percentage rate would
affect how much a terrorist attack affects the economy.
By the beginning of the twenty first century, the rate of urbanization in subSaharan Africa was higher than any other region in the world.20 Some cities have even
experienced growth rates between 11 and 15 % per year. While urbanization under
20

Thomas D. Sisk, “City Level Democracy in the 21st Century,” International Institute
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 2002, pp1-3.
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normal circumstances leads to greater economic specialization and is good for the
economy in the long run, such extreme urbanization rates can significantly strain the
ability of a government to maintain control and provide sufficient social services. Bearing
these problems in mind, I decided to include WDI’s urbanization rates.
For the real GDP, I found a United States Department of Agriculture data set which
provides this data for 190 countries starting in 1969, computed with statistics from the
WDI and the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial statistics.21 Overall, it
is a strong data set, however, when it does not have adequate information for a given
country and year, it proceeds to interpolate that information. Such straight-line
interpolation hinders our efforts to examine the macroeconomic effects of terrorism, so I
decided to drop this information. This has the unfortunate consequence of reducing the
total number of observations for what are often countries within the middle to lower
democracy levels.
In order to examine the level of democracy in a country I used the Polity IV index
as compiled in the ADI. Polity IV’s Institutionalized Democracy Index (IDI) is of
particular importance to us. The IDI is an additive, weighted scale ranging from 0-10 and
attempts to display the quality of democratic institutions based upon this definition
(Marshall, Gurr, and Harff):
A mature and internally coherent democracy, for example,
might be operationally defined as one in which (a) political
participation is unrestricted, open, and fully competitive;
(b) executive recruitment is elective, and (c) constraints on

21
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the chief executive are substantial.22

The weighted variables used to create a working index out of this index are:
competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraint
on Chief Executive, and electoral competitiveness.23 Using these variables as a basis, the
IDI is able to discern between different types of regimes, even showing variation amongst
those countries generally considered Western liberal democracies. The Polity IV
codebook uses the example of France to say that the nation under Charles De Gaulle had
a lower democracy score than later once he was out of office.24
The IDI is often used in conjunction with Polity IV’s Institutionalized Autocracy
Index (IAI). The IAI is similar to the IDI in its structure, as they are both additive,
weighted indices whose range of scores run from 0-10. The IAI defines autocracy
operationally as:

In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress
competitive political participation. Their chief executives
are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the
political elite, and once in office they exercise power with
few institutional constraints. 25

To create an index out of this definition, the IAI looks at five differently weighted
variables. These are: competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive
recruitment, constraints on Chief Executive, regulation of participation, and
22

Monty G. Marhall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. “Polity IV Project: Political
Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009,” April 2009. pp 17-20.
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23
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competitiveness of participation.
Many studies and organization use a combination of the IAI and the IDI known as
the Combined Polity Index, which is included in the WDI. To compute this index, one
subtracts the IAI from the IDI, meaning that the new variable is on a scale ranging from 10 to 10. According to Polity IV, the far left end of the spectrum, -10, can be considered a
hereditary monarchy, whereas the far right end is a consolidated democracy.26 There are
also three ranges of democracies, which I discussed in the Democracy section of the
literature review. Polity defines an autocracy as having a combined polity score of -6 or
less, an anocracy has a score between -5 and +5, and a democracy has a score equal to or
greater than +6.
Although this Combined Polity index is easily found through the World Bank, I
decided against using this data set and instead opted to only use the IDI. The reason for
doing so is explained by the Polity codebook, which notes ‘that the middle of the implied
POLITY ‘spectrum’ is somewhat muddled in terms of the original theory, masking
various combinations of DEMOC and AUTOC scores with the same POLITY score.’27
Since the combined polity score does not reflect exactly what I am looking for, I decided
to concentrate on the IDI. In a similar fashion, I grouped the variables into three groups.
Autocracies would be in the 0-3 range, anocracies would be either 4, 5, or 6, and
democracies would be from 7-10. For this paper, I created a variable called RegimeType,
in which 1 is autocracy, 2 is anocracy, 3 is democracy, and 4 means that there was no
information.

26
27

Idem., pp 20-22
Idem., pp 19-21.
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For my terrorism data, I used the open source Global Terrorism Database, which
includes information on over 87,000 terrorist attacks since 1970. For an act to be included
in the database, it must have these three attributes:
1. The incident must be intentional
2. The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence
3. The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors
Furthermore, the event must satisfy at least two of the following three criteria to be
included.
1. The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social
goal.
2. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some
other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.
3. The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.28
This definition falls in line with the definition I discussed earlier in the literature review.
It can be difficult to determine whether coordinated terrorist attacks should be
considered parts of a larger attack or individual attacks altogether. For example, should
the planes that attacked the Pentagon on September 11th be considered part of the same
attack, which included the planes that hit the World Trade Centers? According to the
Global Terrorism Database, the answer is no. If either the location or times of occurrence
of the attacks are discontinuous, then they will be regarded as individual attacks.29
There are several limitations to the data. The process by which the data is gathered
is one such limitation. The data set is collected from news sources, both official and
unofficial. Official statistics may try to downplay the extent of the damage caused by the

28

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Global
Terrorism Database,” May 2010, pp-4-5.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf
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Idem., pp 6-7
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attack, whereas the media may speculate too much or have inaccurate statistics. Some
attacks may also be misattributed to a certain group, perhaps on purpose or maybe just on
accident. Another limitation is that the quality, accuracy, and volume of information all
vary greatly by country.30 The known information can be very ambiguous, and some
countries (and their respective independent media) may not have the resources to commit
to a full investigation.
For this paper, I generated another two variables from the data set. First, I added the
number of people killed and added it to the number of people wounded to generate a
variable representing the total number of casualties. Secondly, I generated a list of the
number of terrorist attacks per year for each country. These numbers hope to capture both
the magnitude and the rate of attacks over this period.
In order to fully investigate the economic consequences of terrorism, I must control
for internal conflicts. To do so, I turned to the Political Instability Task Force’s (PITF)
PITF-State Failure Problem Set which contains data for 307 events between 1955 and
2009. The events are separated into four separate categories: ethnic wars, revolutionary
wars, adverse regime changes, and genocide or politicide.31
The PITF defines a revolutionary war as an ‘episode of violent conflict between
governments and politically organized groups (political challengers) that seek to
overthrow the central government, to replace its leaders, or to seize power in one

30

National Counterterrorism Center, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2005,” Statistical
Annex. April 7, 2006, 4. < www.state.gov/documents/organization/65489.pdf>
31
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Set. Dataset and Coding Guidelines. May 7 2010. pp 1-5.
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region.”32 It is operationally defined as a having at least 100 armed agents, demonstrators,
troops, etc. and having at least 1000 direct conflict-related deaths over the full course of
the conflict and having at least one year in which more than 100 were killed.
Ethnic wars arise between governments and ethnic communities which attempt to
challenge their status in society. Similar to revolutionary wars, there must be more than
1000 people mobilized to cross the mobilization threshold and more than 1000 direct
conflict-related deaths must be accounted for over the time period for the conflict to be
designated as an ethnic war.33
Adverse regime changes involve a significant, adverse shift in governance. Using the
combined POLITY index, there must be at least a six-point drop on the scale.34 This
could be the result of a coup, an armed conflict, or even by popular referendum. By
relying upon the Polity scale, this variable encounters many of the same problems.
The PITF defines genocides and politicides as events which ‘involve the promotion,
execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents
that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of either communal group.’35 Their
operational definition has three different criteria which must be satisfied: complicity in
mass murder must be well established, the period must last at least six months, and their
victims are non-combatants. The total number of people killed does not play a role in
determining an event’s status of genocide, as the victimized group may not have started
off very large.

32

Idem., 4
Idem., 5
34
Idem., 10-14
35
Idem., 14-16
33
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This data set is very comprehensive, but there can be problems in compiling them
together. For example, some of the conflicts may be considered both an ethnic war and a
genocide. If I were to simply combine everything, I would run the risk of double counting
certain events. Therefore, to prevent this from happening when I was compiling this into
one data set, ‘Internal Conflict,’ I simply used a dummy variable to show that there
existed an internal conflict in that country during that year. While this prevents double
counting, I cannot adequately investigate how the magnitude of the internal conflict
affects our model.
Just as it was important to control for internal conflict, I must also control for
external ones. To do so, I turned to the International Crisis Behavior Project dataset. This
dataset defines an external conflict as a ‘specific act, event or situational change which
leads decision-makers to perceive a threat to basic values, time pressure for response and
heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities.’36 While their dataset
consists of a variety of different types of external conflicts, I only include those which
have an element of violence. Then, similar to the internal conflict data, I created a
dummy variable to determine whether a country had an external conflict during a given
year.

36

Johnathan Wilkenfeld and Michael Brecher, “Codebook for ICB2 – International Crisi
Behavior Project.” July 2010, pp13-15. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/data/ICB2-2010final.pdf
21

RESULTS
BASIC STATISTICS
Table 1 contains basic statistics for all sub-Saharan African countries for the years
between 1970 and 2009. When I look at dy, the variable for logged real GDP growth,
some statistics jump out at us. First of all, sixteen countries averaged negative growth
rates. While the average for the nation is positive, much of the continent has yet to fully
realize its potential.
Sub-Saharan African countries averaged approximately 3.21 terrorist attacks a
year. However, this figure is beset by many outliers and irregularities in the data. For
example, simply controlling for South Africa (ZAF) reduces the average number of
terrorist attacks to 2.04. Similarly, this measure neither shows the distribution of attacks
over the years nor shows if they were clustered together. Nonetheless, it is helpful to start
here to see which countries have been hit the most over these years.
Investment, which is the log of gross capital expenditures, seems to be relatively
well distributed. Perhaps surprisingly, Equatorial Guinea has the highest level (3.52),
whereas the Central Africa Republic has the lowest (2.40). There exists a strong
correlation between investment and trade as a percentage of GDP, which is defined as the
sum of net imports and exports divided by the total GDP. To prevent collinearity from
throwing off the results, I have proceeded to only use trade as a percentage of GDP in
future statistics.

22

REGRESSION ON TERRORISM INCIDENTS
Table 2 is a panel regression looking at different variables to determine if they
influence the rate of terrorism. The first regressions include dy and the existence of
external conflict during the year (E), but continue to include a country’s urbanization rate
(Urb), institutionalized democracy index level (Dem), commodity exports as a percentage
of GDP (ComExp), the log of international trade as a percentage of GDP (Open), and
number of internal conflicts per year (IC).
Without any discrimination amongst the countries, I see that only Dem remains
significant as variables are included. As the country becomes more democratic it tends to
experience more terrorism. This is what I expected to find, as most literature has found
similar results. Internal conflicts also tend to increase the number of terrorist attacks,
which also makes sense. However, the robust standard error for IC is rather large,
diminishing its effect in helping us investigate the causes of terrorism. Furthermore, even
after all of the variables are taken into account, only approximately 24% of the variation
is explained.
Having looked at all the countries together, I split the countries into autocracies,
anocracies, and democracies and proceeded to run the same panel regressions. When a
country is an autocracy (Regime 1), little information can be extracted. However, internal
conflict continues to have a significant impact, and its standard error is smaller, which is
the silver lining to these regressions.
Little more information is available for anocracies. Again, income has no
significant impact on the incidence of terrorism. However, the existence of an external
conflict in a given year significantly decreases the number of attacks. We must take this
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revelation with a grain of salt, as there are not enough observations to continue
investigating its significance, but it remains something which ought to be considered in
the future.
Democracies here have the most significant – and interesting – findings. While
democracies have a higher average rate of democracy, once they are in the ‘democracy’
range, they begin to endure fewer terrorist events as Dem increases. While this seems to
fly in the face of most of the literature, we must consider another fact. Perhaps once a
government passes a certain threshold, a democracy begins to have fewer attacks. This
begs the question if I should further subdivide democracies and run panel regressions to
investigate their effects, but this will not be answered in this paper. There is also the
significant chance that I do not have enough observations, that there have too few
democracies for enough years to truly say for sure.

REGRESSIONS ON GDP GROWTH

I have decided to run panel regressions in the very same manner to determine the
macroeconomic consequences of terrorism.
The panel regression with all of the countries contains many significant variables,
the most important one being T, the number of terrorist attacks in a year. Throughout the
entire panel, the number of terrorist attacks remains significant and negative at the 5%
level. Later, the number of casualties becomes significant at the same level – leadings us
to believe that there indeed is a strong correlation between the economy and both the
number of and the magnitude of the attacks.
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Several other variables start off significant but lose this status as more variables
are added. The most interesting case of this involves the institutionalized democracy
index. At one point, Dem was significant at the 1% level, but began to drop off once I
included commodities as a percentage of GDP (ComExp) and is no longer significant
once openness is included.
Luckily I get better panel regression results when looking at the variables causing
growth. In the first case, autocracy, I see that neither the magnitude (cas) nor the rate (T)
of terrorist attacks become significant until I include several variables. However, the
results are mixed. T follows the traditional model, and each attack has a significant and
adverse (albeit small) effect on dy, but the number of casualties actually correlates to a
positive increase in dy. However, these effects only become significant once the number
of observations drops from 1145 to 407 after I include the ComExp variable, leading me
to believe that this is the result of outliers in a smaller sample.
While it does not extend throughout all of the regressions, terrorism does seem to
have a significant impact on dy. However, I did not expect the results to be positive
throughout the entire panel. This may be a result of only using 179 (or, later, only 88)
observations. On the other hand, I have at least one regression which shows that the
magnitude of terrorism indeed has a very significant (at the 1% level) and negative effect.
The last panel regression looks at the channels which affect real GDP per capita
growth. Until the last few variables are added, terrorism has a significant but negative
effect, yet this result changes once I add the variable ComExp. The results are not perfect,
but it is not a bad assumption to say that terrorism affects dy, but only by a small
magnitude.
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CONCLUSION
I started this paper to determine whether it was foolish to limit democracy to a
binary variable when studying the effects of terrorism. Having run several regressions, I
can finally arrive at several conclusions.
Just as the literature said, I found that democracies do indeed suffer from higher
levels of terrorist attacks, but the relationship between democracy and terrorist incidents
does not seem to be completely linear or continuous. My data show that democracies
have a higher mean of attacks, yet my regressions say up to the 1% confidence level that,
once a nation becomes a democracy, further democratization actually brings about a
desirable solution to terrorism.
The strength of the correlation between regime type and number of terrorist
attacks breaks down pretty quickly once I move on to anocracies and autocracies. While
the data shows that the relationship between anocracy and terrorism is at least somewhat
significant and negative, the evidence is not strong enough to warrant any significant
conclusions.
I can reach similar conclusion concerning the economic effects of terrorism. I see
that both the quantity and magnitude of terrorist attacks affect growth through different
yet significant channels. Why the regressions have shown that casualties actually
correlate to a small increase in growth is something which the model does not explain,
yet is worth exploring in future papers.
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When I looked at the same effects on a regime basis, I came across results which
were both expected and unexpected. I both expected and found terrorism to have a
statistically significant and negative relation to growth in democracies, but I did not think
that anocracies would have statistically significant and positive results. For this reason, I
suspect that my hypothesis that terrorism has different effects on different types of
regimes is correct, but the assumption of the channels through which this occurs requires
further studies.
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TABLES

Country List

Country
Code
AGO
BDI
BEN
BFA
BWA
CIV
CMR
COG
COM
CPV
DJI
ERI
ETH
GAB
GHA
GIN
GMB
GNB
GNQ
KEN
LBR
LSO
MDG
MLI
MOZ
MRT
MUS
MWI
NAM
NER
NGA

Country
Angola
Burundi
Benin
Burkina Faso
Botswana
Cote d'Ivoire
Cameroon
Congo, Republic of
Comoros
Cape Verde
Djibouti
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Ghana
Guinea
Gambia, The
Guinea-Bissau
Equatorial Guinea
Kenya
Liberia
Lesotho
Madagascar
Mali
Mozambique
Mauritania
Mauritius
Malawi
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
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RWA
SDN
SEN
SLE
SOM
STP
SWZ
SYC
TCD
TGO
TZA
UGA
ZAF
ZAR
ZMB
ZWE

Rwanda
Sudan
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sao Tome and
Principe
Swaziland
Seychelles
Chad
Togo
Tanzania
Uganda
South Africa
Congo, DR
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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Basic Country Statistics

Country
AGO
BDI
BEN
BFA
BWA
CIV
CMR
COG
COM
CPV
DJI
ERI
ETH
GAB
GHA
GIN
GMB
GNB
GNQ
KEN
LBR
LSO
MDG
MLI
MOZ
MRT
MUS
MWI
NAM
NER
NGA
RWA
SDN
SEN

dy
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.05
-0.01
0.01
0.01
-0.01
0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.04
0.01
-0.04
0.03
-0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.04
0.01
0.00
-0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.00

T
11.98
8.70
0.23
0.08
0.20
1.00
0.53
0.63
0.13
0.18
0.48
0.00
3.28
0.10
0.43
0.30
0.08
0.18
0.03
3.48
0.00
0.60
0.50
1.13
5.58
0.25
0.00
0.10
3.55
1.30
7.35
3.30
4.50
2.23

Investment
2.65
2.29
2.79
2.94
3.45
2.65
2.95
3.29
2.88
3.37
2.54
3.11
2.88
3.44
2.63
2.93
2.86
3.15
3.52
3.01
2.47
3.50
2.55
2.94
2.82
3.12
3.24
3.02
3.00
2.52
2.71
2.74
2.80

Trade (%GDP)
112.32
33.16
45.86
35.16
100.29
73.51
45.96
113.77
55.90
74.08
99.65
84.88
28.28
96.65
57.04
56.58
100.66
54.86
126.39
59.55
108.82
134.86
47.00
51.76
51.82
101.28
118.36
61.83
108.40
43.89
57.39
32.75
27.89
64.45
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SLE
SOM
STP
SWZ
SYC
TCD
TGO
TZA
UGA
ZAF
ZAR
ZMB
ZWE
Total

0.00
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.00
-0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
-0.03
-0.01
-0.01
0.01

2.20
13.43
0.00
0.38
0.05
1.10
1.20
0.25
7.88
59.27
3.06
1.50
4.23
3.34

2.28
3.13

48.09
56.89

3.04
3.30
2.61
2.97
2.96
2.51
3.03
2.24
2.97
2.83
2.90

153.70
152.43
55.59
88.89
49.24
32.58
52.01
44.40
74.35
57.32
72.40
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PANEL REGRESSIONS
Panel 1:
Regressions on T

Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in square brackets. *, ** and *** represent statistical
significance at the .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. All specifications include time and
individual fixed e ects. Models (1) through (5) are di erent specifications of panel T regressions.
Models (1) through (5) are the basic OLS model adding separately other variables such as the
urbanization rate (Urb), the institutionalized democracy level (Dem), external wars (W),
commodity exports as a percentage of GDP (ComExp), and net trade as a percentage of GDP
(Open). Included in each regression is the lag of GDP per capita (dy) and dummy variable for the
presence of external conflicts (E). R-squared is calculated without fixed e ects.
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Panel 2:
Regime 1: Regressions on T

Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in square brackets. *, ** and *** represent statistical
significance at the .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. Models (1) through (5) are di erent
specifications of panel T regressions. Models (1) through (5) are the basic OLS model adding
separately other variables such as the urbanization rate (Urb), the institutionalized democracy
level (Dem), external wars (W), commodity exports as a percentage of GDP (ComExp), and net
trade as a percentage of GDP (Open). Included in each regression is the lag of GDP per capita
(dy) and dummy variable for the presence of external conflicts (E). R-squared is calculated
without fixed e ects.

33

Panel 3:
Regime 2: Regressions on T

Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in square brackets. *, ** and *** represent statistical
significance at the .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. Models (1) through (5) are di erent
specifications of panel T regressions. Models (1) through (5) are the basic OLS model adding
separately other variables such as the urbanization rate (Urb), the institutionalized democracy
level (Dem), external wars (W), commodity exports as a percentage of GDP (ComExp), and net
trade as a percentage of GDP (Open). Included in each regression is the lag of GDP per capita
(dy) and dummy variable for the presence of external conflicts (E). R-squared is calculated
without fixed e ects.
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Panel 4:
Regime 3: Regressions on T

Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in square brackets. *, ** and *** represent statistical
significance at the .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. Models (1) through (5) are di erent
specifications of panel T regressions. Models (1) through (5) are the basic OLS model adding
separately other variables such as the urbanization rate (Urb), the institutionalized democracy
level (Dem), external wars (W), commodity exports as a percentage of GDP (ComExp), and net
trade as a percentage of GDP (Open). Included in each regression is the lag of GDP per capita
(dy) and dummy variable for the presence of external conflicts (E). R-squared is calculated
without fixed e ects.
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Notes: For the remaining tables, robust standard errors are presented in square brackets. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the
.10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. Models (1) through (7) are di erent specifications of panel growth regressions. Models (1) through (7) are
the basic OLS model adding separately other variables such as the urbanization rate (Urb), the institutionalized democracy level (Dem), the
dummy variable for the presence of an external conflict (E), commodity exports as a percentage of GDP (ComExp), the number of casualties
as a result of terrorist attacks (cas), internal conflict (IC) and net trade as a percentage of GDP (Open). Included in each regression is the lag of
GDP per capita (lnylag) and the number of terrorist attacks (T). R-squared is calculated without fixed effects.
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